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ABSTRACT
　前提は，意味論的には命題が真か偽となるための予備条件として，また語用論的には発話が適切とな
るために話者と聴者が共有すべき情報として捉えられる。しかし実際の談話中では，前提はさまざまな
形で取り消される。予備条件としての前提が，なぜ，またどのように取り消されるのか。本論文では，
前提の取り消しとその不規則性を，否定，スコープ，視点との関連において分析し，以下を指摘する。
1）「前提は否定文においても保持される」は「命題が真のときの前提は，偽のときにも保持される」と
修正される，2）否定のスコープの解釈が切り替わった結果，狭いスコープの否定における前提が取り消
される，3）叙実述語が前提を投射しないのは，埋め込み文が仮定や時制などよりも狭いスコープを持つ
場合である，4）前提には話者以外の視点も関与する。スコープの曖昧性，可能世界，視点の関与を見る
ことで，一見不規則な前提のふるまいを系統的に説明できる。
 The notion of presupposition plays an important role in explaining the meaning of utterances. It is commonly 
introduced as a precondition to be met in order for a sentence to be true or false, or in order for an utterance 
to be felicitous. However, in discourse, presuppositions are cancelled in various ways. Why and how are they 
cancelled if they are ‘preconditions’? This paper examines major examples that illustrate apparent irregularities 
in the cancellation of presuppositions and analyzes the various factors at work. To that end, semantic and 
pragmatic analyses are given in relation to negation, scope, and perspectives. It is argued that: 1) the alleged 
property that ‘presuppositions survive under negation’ should be modified to: ‘presuppositions survive under 
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the reversal of the truth value’, 2) when the scope interpretation of the negation is switched from a narrow-
scope to a wide-scope, the presupposition in the former interpretation may not survive in the latter, 3) apparent 
irregularities in the behavior of factive predicates (e.g. ‘to know’, ‘to realize’) are attributed to scope ambiguity 
between the embedded sentence and certain operators such as conditionals and tenses, 4) presupposition 
involves spaces other than the real world and perspectives other than that of the speaker. Presuppositions are 
in fact preconditions in one sense or another. However, these can be met not only in the real world and from 
the speaker’s perspective, but in different spaces and from different perspectives triggered by the context. This 
accounts for the dynamism and apparent irregularities of presuppositions.
1.   Introduction
 The notion of presupposition plays an important 
role in explaining the meaning of utterances. The 
notion is traditionally introduced as a precondition 
to be met in order for a sentence to be true or false 
(from a logical/semantic perspective), or in order 
for an utterance to be felicitous (from a pragmatic 
perspective). In the classical examples below, the 
a-sentence presupposes the b-sentence:
(1) a. The king of France is bald.
  b. There is a unique king of France.
(2) a. John stopped smoking.
  b. John was smoking.
 However, i t i s a rgued tha t in d i scourse 
presuppositions are apparently cancelled in various 
ways. To take just one example from Huang (2007):
(3)  There is no king of France. Therefore the king 
of France isn’t bald.
 According to Huang, the second sentence above 
does not presuppose that there is a king of France, 
‘because the putative presupposition is defeated by 
the contradictory proposition that there is no king 
of France, which has already been established in 
the immediate discourse context’ (p.81). However, 
Huang, just as many others, introduces ‘constancy 
under negation’ as one of the basic properties of 
presupposition, mentioning that presuppositions 
survive under negation. If we take this literally, 
we may think that the presupposition at issue 
should remain in the second sentence, just as in its 
affirmative version.
 Atlas (2001) gives a similar example:
(4)  The king of France isn’t bald. -- There is no 
king of France.
 As he mentions, the presupposition of the first 
sentence (i.e. the existence of the king of France) is 
explicitly cancelled in the second sentence. But no 
further explanation is given.
 Now the question is why the second sentence can 
be uttered felicitously at all. If the presupposition 
is in fact a semantic or pragmatic precondition in 
the sense of a requirement for the sentence or the 
utterance, then why can it be cancelled? Do the 
sentences remain truthful and utterances felicitous?
 Our question concerns the basic property, or even 
the definition, of presupposition expressed in terms 
of ‘precondition’. Thus, clarification is needed about 
the conditions on cancellation from both theoretical 
and educational perspectives. 
 This paper examines major examples which 
illustrate apparent irregularities of the cancellation 
phenomena and analyzes the factors at work. To that 
end, semantic and pragmatic analyses are given in 
relation to negation, scope, and perspectives.
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2.   Preliminaries 
 As a basis for the discussions to follow, a brief 
summary of major approaches to presupposition is 
given below.
2.1   Semantic and pragmatic presuppositions
(5) a. The king of France is bald.
  b. There is a unique king of France.
  c. The individual in question is bald.
 Russell (1905) argued in the framework of logic 
that sentence (5a) asserts both (5b) and (5c). For 
Russell, therefore, if either (5b) or (5c) is false, then 
(5a) is false. 
 Strawson (1950), in contrast, distinguished 
between two levels: in order for sentence (5a) to 
be true or false, (5b) should be true. Under this 
condition, (5a) asserts (5c). For Strawson, therefore, 
when the precondition (5b) is not met, sentence 
(5a) has no truth value, instead of being false. Thus, 
the evaluation of (5a) has three cases; true, false, 
or no truth value (‘truth value gap’). This kind of 
precondition for the proposition having a truth value 
is called a semantic presupposition.
 The notion of pragmatic presupposition was 
then employed, first as a background assumption 
shared by discourse participants and then in a more 
sophisticated manner (references herein). It was 
observed that the hearer often ‘accommodates’ 
the presuppositions after the utterance is made. 
Cancellation and accommodation illustrate the 
dynamism of presuppositions in the discourse.
2.2   Projection problem
 A central concern in the theory of presupposition 
since 1970’s has been so called projection problem. 
It addresses the question: In what conditions are 
presuppositions of smaller components inherited 
onto a larger unit in the sentence or the discourse? 
 Earl ier work (Kart tunen 1973, Stalnaker 
1973) argued that the answer to the question 
above is determined by the linguistic devices 
used (conjunctions, constructions, words and 
phrases). They are classified into three types: holes 
(which let the presuppositions at a lower level go 
through to a higher level), plugs (which block off 
the presuppositions), and filters (which behave 
differently, depending on the context). The main 
focus of this framework is the systematic behavior 
of presuppositions. However, irregularities are 
observed with holes and plugs too, as mentioned in 
the literature (Levionson 1983, Huang 2007, among 
others).
 Gazder (1979) argued that presuppositions will 
be cancelled when they are inconsistent with other 
discourse elements which are given a higher priority. 
He proposes a hierarchy of discourse elements, as in 
(6) below. In his theory, a presupposition is cancelled 
when it is incompatible with the participants’ 
background assumption, for example.
(6)  Gazder ’s (1979) hierarchy of discourse 
elements
 Background assumptions > Contextual factors > 
Semantic entailments > Conversational implicatures 
> Presuppositions
2.3   Dynamic semantic theory
 Recent works analyzed various phenomena 
concerning presupposition in the framework of 
dynamic semantic theory of context change (Lewis 
1979, Heim 1983, 1992, Chierchia and McConnell-
Ginet 2000, Kadmon 2001, among others).
 I t i s a l so o f ten observed tha t necessary 
presuppositions are added into the knowledge of 
discourse participants after the utterance is made, in 
order to make the utterance felicitous. This kind of 
phenomena is called accommodation. 
 Both cancellation and accommodation are 
explained in terms of the updates made on the 
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common ground of discourse participants.
3.   Presupposition, negation, and truth value
 Let us first examine how negation is related to 
presuppositions.
3.1   The status of semantic presupposition
 Semantic presupposition as a condition for the 
presence of the truth value (either true or false) 
is considered to be part of lexical semantics 
of the linguistic element (e.g. words, phrases, 
constructions), because i t is tr iggered on a 
conventional, rather than conversational, basis. 
I argue that it is a semantic counterpart of well-
formedness of a proposition. It is not whether the 
proposition has a truth value but whether it is in fact 
licensed as a proposition. 
 H u a n g ( 2 0 0 7 )  m e n t i o n s  t h a t  ‘ w h e n a 
presupposition is queried, the relevant lexical 
presupposition trigger is frequently queried in an 
explicit way’, providing examples including the 
following (p.67, fn. 2. Italics are by Huang.)
(7) a. The king of France is bald.
  b.  The king of France? But is France not a 
republic?
(8) a. The boy cried wolf again. 
  b.  What do you mean by ‘again’? The boy 
didn’t cry wolf before. 
 I analyze that these questions are meta linguistic 
ones concerning the use of the expressions at issue. 
They reflect the speaker’s attempt either to indicate 
the inappropriateness (i.e. ‘semantic ill-formedness’) 
of the expressions in focus or to modify the 
statement to a semantically complete (i.e. ‘well-
formed’) proposition. Therefore, the reply may also 
be, for example, ‘The prime minister of France, 
you mean? Yes, he is bald’. These examples support 
the view that presupposition concerns the well-
formedness of a proposition, rather than the presence 
or absence of its truth value. 
3.2   Alleged ‘constancy under negation’
 It is a common understanding that presupposition 
survives under negation (Chierchia and McConnell-
Ginet 2000, Kadmon 2001, Huang 2007, and other 
references herein). In (9), for example, both (9a) and 
its negation (9b) presumably presupposes (9c): 
(9) a. John stopped smoking.
  b. John didn’t stop smoking.
  c. John was smoking.
 Now let us consider the following.
(10) A:  Fred stopped smoking after the health 
checkup. Did John stop smoking too?
  B:  No, he didn’t. Actually, he never smoked. He 
went on a diet, though.
  A: Oh, that’s good.
 B’s utterance does not raise a problem. The 
first sentence negates (9a)a being true, and it is 
ambiguous:
(11) a.  The presupposition (9c) is met and John 
continued to smoke.
  b. The presupposition (9c) is not met.
 Note that (11a) indicates (9a) is false, whereas 
(11b) indicates it has no truth value. Here, we find 
that negation in natural language in the form of 
‘{It is not the case / It does not hold} that S’ (S is 
a sentence), ‘not Pred’ (Pred is a predicate), and so 
forth, does not just reverse the truth value between 
true and false, like logical negation, but involves 
truth value gap.
 So called narrow scope negation assumes that 
the presupposition is met and negates the predicate. 
Wide scope negation, on the other hand, denies 
that the proposition is true, leaving the status of the 
presupposition open. Thus wide scope negation 
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allows for two cases: 1) the presupposition is met 
and the proposition is false, or 2) the presupposition 
is not met and the proposition has no truth value.
 To deal with wide scope negation formally, we 
could introduce non-bivalent semantics with a truth 
value gap introduced. An alternative approach is 
to attribute the truth value gap case to the unique 
property of natural language negation. We could 
consider that presupposition concerns the semantic 
well-formedness of the proposition (i.e. whether 
the sentence in fact expresses a proposition) and 
that natural language negation concerns both well-
formedness and truth value. In the latter approach, 
therefore, logical negation in propositional semantics 
is not affected, because propositional semantics 
applies only to (well-formed) propositions. I propose 
to take the latter approach, because it does not 
require any change in propositional semantics and 
also does justice to the notion of presupposition.
 Now, let us examine the claim that presuppositions 
survive under negat ion ( ‘constancy under 
negation’ in Huang’s term). We just found in the 
above that presuppositions survive under narrow 
scope negation, which in turn assumes that the 
presuppositions in question hold. It is now clear 
that the idea of ‘constancy under negation’ makes a 
circulatory argument.
 The correct statement is the following: 
(12)  ‘Constancy under the reversal of the truth 
value’: If a presupposition q holds for a true 
proposition p, then it also holds when p is false. 
3.3   Focus and presupposition
 Now let us examine how focus may affect the 
presupposition, in the case of ‘stop smoking’.
 At the semantic level, ‘stop smoking’ conventionally 
triggers the presupposition that the subject individual 
was smoking. It is interesting to see the situation 
at the pragmatic level. When a focus is on ‘stop’, 
as in (13a), the presupposition ‘John was smoking’ 
does not remain. When a focus is on ‘smoking’, the 
presupposition is ‘John was doing something (to 
stop)’, instead. When the whole VP ‘stop smoking’ is 
in focus, the presupposition in question may or may 
not hold, context-dependently. (See Atlas 2001 for a 
relevant example and discussion.)
(13) a.  John did not STOP smoking. He STARTED 
smoking. 
  b.  I thought John STARTED smoking. Did he 
STOP smoking?
 The observation is summarized as follows:
(14)  Focused element in ‘stop smoking’ and the 
presumable presupposition 
 Focused element  Presupposition
 STOP smoking N. A.
 stop SMOKING  John was doing something
 STOP SMOKING (John was smoking)
 Thus, the idea of ‘constancy under negation’ is 
defeated from a pragmatic perspective too.
3.4    What’s going on behind the cancellation 
of presupposition?
 A question arises: why does it lead to the 
cancellation of presupposition, instead of resulting 
in infelicity? Relevant remarks can be seen on 
the constraints on accommodation, which is the 
addition of presuppositions to the common ground as 
required in the discourse. Chierchier and McConnell-
Ginet (1990) argues: ‘if the presupposition required 
is inconsistent with what is already in the common 
ground, the utterance is infelicitous, because its 
presupposition cannot be accommodated by simple 
addition to the existing common ground.’ (p.294) 
Soames (1979) mentions the same point: ‘what is 
accommodated must be uncontroversial’.
 In this light, we could consider that if a new 
statement is incompatible with earlier statements 
including their presuppositions, then a natural 
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option would be give up making the new statement. 
However, our observations indicate that a higher 
priority can be given to the new statement than the 
incompatible presuppositions in the current discourse 
without causing a problem. The literature provides 
examples to illustrate this point but does not explain 
why this works.
 Let us see what is going on in the example below:
(15)  The king of Bhutan isn’t bald: he is young. The 
king of France isn’t bald: there is no king of 
France.
 The last part of this utterance sounds tricky, but it 
still works. The first half of the utterance concerning 
the king of Bhutan presupposes and entails the 
existence of the king. In the second half, the hearer 
is invited to presuppose the existence of the king. 
But the sentence itself allows for another, marked 
case, in which the presupposition is not met. The last 
sentence reveals the fact that there is no such king.
 By uttering the last sentence, the speaker 
switches from the default interpretation with a 
narrow scope negation to the marked interpretation 
with a wide scope negation. Note that precisely 
speaking the presupposition in the narrow-
scope negation interpretation is not cancelled 
but remains unchanged. What is cancelled is the 
narrow-scope negation interpretation. As a result, 
the presupposition there disappears. The term 
‘cancellation of presupposition’ covers a wide range 
of phenomena including those like the current 
example.
4.    Apparent irregularities with factive 
predicates
 Factive predicates are so called because they 
require, and thus presuppose, that the embedded 
proposit ion be true. However, they exhibit 
irregularities as to whether the presupposition should 
be preserved or not. 
 Here is an example taken from Chierchier and 
McConnell-Ginet (1990):
(16) a.  If Bill discovers that syntax is easy, he will be 
delighted. 
  b. Syntax is easy. 
  c.  If I discover that syntax is easy, I will be 
delighted.
 They observe that: ‘Sentence (16a) seems 
generally to need (16b) for felicity. Hence (16a) 
presupposes (16b). But in special circumstances this 
presupposition can be cancelled (for instance, if the 
context makes it clear that the speaker doesn’t know 
whether syntax is easy).’ (p.286) In contrast, (16c) 
does not presuppose (16b), given that the discovery 
of (16b) is hypothetical. Chierchier and McConnell-
Gine consider that this illustrates the irregularity of 
the status of the ‘factive’ predicate: in the case of the 
first person subject, the verb ‘discover’ is not factive.
 Kadmon (2001), in contrast, argues that there 
is nothing special about the behavior of factive 
predicates. 
 Supporting Kadmon’s view, I propose below an 
account on the basis of scope ambiguity. My point 
is that the requirement for the embedded proposition 
remains unchanged, that is, it should be true, but that 
it needs not be in the real world. My account is based 
on scope ambiguity between embedding and some 
operator such as conditional, modal, and tense.
 Let us first see a traditional example in which 
the reference of the NP ‘a linguist’ is ambiguous 
between the specific and unspecific reading:
(17)   Mary wants to marry a linguist. 
 In the example above, Mary may have a specific 
linguist in mind (i.e. a specific reference) or she 
has no idea about who it will be (i.e. an unspecific 
reference).
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 This ambiguity of the sentence is attributed to the 
scope ambiguity of the NP ‘a linguist’. When the 
NP has a narrow scope under the modal operator 
‘want’, the NP refers to an unspecific linguist in the 
hypothetical world introduced by the modal. When 
the NP has a wide scope beyond the modal operator, 
the NP refers to a specific linguist in the real world.
 My analysis of (16c) goes along the same 
lines. Now the scope ambiguity is seen between 
the if-conditional and the embedded sentence, 
(16b). Chierchier and McConnell-Ginet’s (1990) 
observation that ‘sentence (16a) seems generally 
to need (16b) for felicity’ indicates that (16a) is 
more likely to have a wider scope than the if-clause, 
licensing it as a presupposition of the whole 
sentence. This interpretation is only more typical, 
not required. The other interpretation is also possible 
where (16a) is under the scope of the conditional 
and (16b) is not presupposed. The following version 
illustrates the point:
(18)  If Bill discovers that syntax is easy, he will 
be delighted. If Bill discovers that syntax is 
difficult, he will be in a trouble.
 Example (18) above does not require, and even 
allow for, a presupposition that syntax is easy/
difficult is true. Still, as a semantic presupposition, 
syntax being easy/difficult should be true in the 
hypothetical world introduced by the conditional.
 Now let us consider (16c). Here, for the sake of 
the consistency about the speaker’s knowledge, the 
only plausible interpretation would be that (16b) is 
not presupposed.
5.   Perspectives
 Among other contextual elements, the following 
have a crucial effect on the status of presupposition: 
1) the bearer of the presupposition (e.g. the 
speaker, the hearer), 2) the space into which the 
presupposition is introduced, and 3) the point in 
discourse.
 Chierchier and McConnell-Ginet’s (2000) gives a 
good example which illustrates the point:
(19)  A, noticing the open door: 
        Was it you who opened the door to the 
porch? I closed it at lunch time.
  B:  Well, it wasn’t me who opened it, because I’ve 
been gone all afternoon, and it wasn’t Joan 
who opened it, because……, and it wasn’t any 
of the kids who opened it, because…., and I 
strongly suspect that nobody opened it – there 
was a lot of wind this afternoon, you know.
 The it-cleft sentence ‘it wasn’t me who opened 
it’ triggers a presupposition that somebody opened 
the door, and yet speaker B ends up with saying that 
he doubts it. One way of explaining this example 
is, as Chierchier and McConnell-Gine argue, that B 
tentatively takes the presupposition required by the 
it-cleft sentences, and then defeats it after examining 
all the possibilities.
 An alternative account is that the presupposition 
in question is speaker A’s. B tentatively takes over 
the presupposition from A’s perspective, while 
providing counterevidence to it. B eventually defeats 
the presupposition. There is no contradiction if B 
doubted the presupposition from the beginning.
 Chierchier and McConnell-Ginet (2000) discuss a 
constraint on the presupposition cancellation in the 
following.
(20)  Jim does not know that Ann is unfaithful, 
because she isn’t.
 ‘To assert (20) in a context that contains nothing 
about Ann’s fidelity before the utterance occurs 
in very odd indeed, since it makes the hearer 
accommodate by adding the proposition that is 
explicitly denied in the because clause.’ (p.387) 
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This kind of example is often given as a simple 
illustration of presupposition cancellation, but their 
observation makes a step forward. 
 To have a closer look at the situation, let us now 
suppose the following dialogue:
(21) A:  Does Jim know that Ann is unfaithful?
  B:  No, he doesn’t (know that Ann is unfaithful), 
because she isn’t.
 In this sequence, B’s utterance sounds fine. 
What is the difference from (20)? We can explain 
it by considering the perspective from which 
the presupposition is introduced. In (21), the 
presupposition ‘Ann is unfaithful’ is introduced by 
speaker A by means of the factive verb ‘to know’. 
In his reply, B first takes A’s perspective and 
employs the presupposition in question. He then 
explicitly denies it from his perspective. There is no 
contradiction or complication within B’s utterance. 
It is not that B introduces his presupposition (‘Ann 
is unfaithful’) and cancels it in a moment. What B 
does is to switch the perspective from A’s to his own. 
The essential difference between (20) and (21) is the 
involvement of two perspectives corresponding to 
different statuses (i. e. presence or absence) of the 
presupposition at issue.
6.   Conclusion
 Semantic presupposition as a condition for the 
presence of the truth value (either true or false) 
is considered to be part of lexical semantics 
of the linguistic element (e.g. words, phrases, 
constructions), because it is triggered conventionally, 
rather than conversationally. I argue that it is a 
semantic counterpart of well-formedness of a 
proposition. The point is not whether the proposition 
has a truth value but whether it is in fact licensed as a 
proposition. 
 Assuming that semantic presupposition is part 
of lexical semantics, it cannot be cancelled. How 
then can we explain a variety of presupposition 
cancellation phenomena? I analyzed that semantic 
presuppositions can be met not only in the real world 
from the speaker’s perspective but in various kinds 
of space and time and from different perspectives. 
This holds for pragmatic presuppositions as well. 
The literature reduces such phenomena to the 
cancellation of presuppositions. However, they are 
better understood as shifting from the default space 
(i.e. the real world) and the default perspective (of 
the speaker) to some other ones. The dynamism 
of presupposition concerning cancellation and 
accommodation is attributed to the contribution of 
the pragmatic factors in the discourse as mentioned 
above.
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